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about the tsarist army's violence toward civilians never attracted much sympathy. For both international opinion at the time and historians today, they were always overshadowed by the "atrocities" that, as John Horne and Alan Kramer conclusively demonstrated a decade ago, the Germans themselves perpetrated in Belgium and France. 4 Indeed, until very recently, the consensus was that stories of the "Cossack terror" in East Prussia were mostly propaganda fabrications. While looting and even destruction have sometimes been acknowledged, systematic violence against civilians, and especially killing, has been regarded as uncharacteristic of the Russian invasions. 5 Work by Vėjas Gabriel Liulevičius and Peter Hoeres has begun to question this view but, based on wartime and postwar publications rather than archival sources, has not disproved it. 6 Understanding what took place in East Prussia in 1914-15 is important for two reasons. First, the Russian army's conduct in this campaign offers a much-needed point of comparison with which to test theories of German military exceptionalism. Current historiography argues that imperial German military culture was uniquely prone to promote violence against civilians. For Horne and Kramer, it was the force's institutional memory of fighting francs-tireurs in 1870-71, its operational doctrine that regarded armed civilians as illegitimate combatants, and the "militarist nationalism" that allegedly permeated its officer corps that prepared the way for its slaughter of 6,427 Belgian and French citizens in 1914. 7 Isabel V. Hull posits that military culture was not just influential but even deterministic in shaping German conduct. "Standard operating procedures" and "basic assumptions" overvaluing force and encouraging control mania were perpetuated and reinforced without challenge owing to the army's constitutional exemption from external oversight. This, she argues, strengthened the force's lethal tendency to instrumentalize civilians and set it on a course of repeated and increasingly dysfunctional violence, predisposing it to commit acts of extreme brutality against enemy populations.
8 A lack of comparable research on other militaries means, however, that the allegedly exceptional nature of German military culture and atrocities remains highly questionable. Through an examination of Russian conduct in East Prussia, this article will help to ascertain whether the killing of noncombatants was a specifically German practice or a more general characteristic of early twentieth-century European warfare. 14 See Liulevičius, "Precursors and Precedents," 39. 16 Fritz Gause, Die Russen in Ostpreußen 1914/15: Im Auftrage des Landeshauptmanns der Provinz Ostpreußen ðKönigsberg, 1931Þ. For Gause's life and career, see the 15 Comparison of today's archival holdings with a survey of documentation pertaining to the invasions published in 1930 indicates that official provincial records have had a high rate of survival. The 1930 survey mentioned four volumes devoted to Russian atrocities among the files of the Oberpräsident. I located five such volumes, two of which are now in Berlin and three in Olsztyn, Poland. See Fritz Gause, "Die Quellen zur Geschichte des Russeneinfalls in Ostpreußen im Jahre 1914," Altpreußische Forschungen 7 ð1930Þ: 82-106, esp. 86. book was published in 1931, a time when East Prussia was stranded beyond the Reich's border and when emphasizing the province's wartime suffering was a means of reinforcing German claims over the territory. Moreover, according to the book's preface, the work's "spiritual father" was Professor Albert Brackmann, a man now best remembered as a senior Ostforscher, one of the Nazis' academic collaborators. 17 Nonetheless, cross-checks with the existing archival evidence reveal that Gause's study was a sound piece of historical research. As he utilized some important material that has since been destroyed, it is a valuable supplement to surviving provincial records.
The investigation described here is organized into four parts. The first sketches the course of the invasions, while the second examines the atrocity inquiries conducted in their aftermath. The third part analyzes patterns of Russian violence and compares them with those of contemporaneous German atrocities in the west. Finally, the fourth part examines the impact of the invasions on the German people and how these experiences affected their readiness to fight the twentieth century's first "total war."
I
When Germany declared war on Russia on August 1, 1914, there can have been few among the two million inhabitants of East Prussia who felt no apprehension. People had begun to leave the border areas already at the end of July. Karol Małłek, a native of the Masurian village Brodowen, recalled that when mobilization was announced, "everybody cried and wailed." 18 The province, faced on two sides by Russian territory, was frighteningly vulnerable to attack ðfig. 1Þ. Although the Prussian war minister had publicly insisted a year earlier that "neither in East Prussia nor elsewhere is a surrender of German land considered," the army had allotted just eleven infantry divisions and a cavalry division, a mere tenth of its available forces, to its defense. 19 There was little in the region of such 17 Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 9. For Brackmann's relations with the Nazis, see economic value that it could not at least temporarily be relinquished. The population, largely German, but including a 337,300-strong Polish-speaking Masurian minority in the south and 112,500 Lithuanians in the northeast, mostly worked in agriculture and was poor by national standards. It was also scattered: almost half of the inhabitants lived in villages of fewer than 500 people. The province possessed just four self-governing cities, and three of these-Allenstein, Insterburg, and Tilsit-had only 30,000 to 40,000 inhabitants. The sole major municipality, with almost a quarter of a million citizens, was the heavily fortified provincial capital of Königsberg. 20 East Prussia suffered two invasions and a destructive raid in 1914-15. The first invasion began in mid-August 1914 and resulted in two-thirds of the province being briefly overrun. Attack came from two directions: General Pavel Rennenkampf 's First Army, a force of six and a half infantry divisions, five and a half cavalry divisions, and 492 guns, advanced from the east on August 15. Five days later, the forces of the Russian Second Army under General Aleksandr Samsonovnine and a half infantry divisions, three cavalry divisions, and 738 guns-crossed East Prussia's southeastern border. 21 The panic that the invaders' arrival caused among the population was exacerbated and spread to still-unthreatened parts of the province by an ill-considered military order of August 22 instructing civilians urgently to take their harvest and livestock to safety across the Vistula. A wave of refugees, comprising hundreds of thousands of frightened people, swept westward, clogging the roads with farm wagons and cattle. 22 The civil administration in areas under assault also evacuated: the president of Gumbinnen County ordered his officials on August 21 to take refuge in Königsberg, and two days later his counterpart in Allenstein transferred his offices to Danzig. 23 the defending Eighth Army and Rennenkampf's troops outside Gumbinnen on August 20 had been inconclusive. However, the Germans then redeployed to face Samsonov in the southwest of the province, preparing the way for the infamous Battle of Tannenberg. On August 27, they attacked the Russian general's left wing, broke through, and in the final days of the month surrounded and annihilated his Second Army, taking 92,000 prisoners and nearly 400 guns. The crushing victory prompted Rennenkampf, whose advance units had briefly cut off Königsberg, to halt. Once again shifting their men by rail, the Germans attacked the First Army at the Battle of the Masurian Lakes on September 7-10, forcing it into retreat. By September 13, having lost a further 30,000 men as prisoners, the Russians had withdrawn into their own territory. East Prussia had been liberated. 24 The respite did not last long, however. Throughout October there was heavy fighting along the borders, and at the beginning of November a second invasion was undertaken by a new Russian force, the Tenth Army under General Sievers. The Germans were compelled to abandon their eastern districts and withdraw to the defensive Angerapp line. This time, unlike in the summer, an orderly evacuation of inhabitants from the threatened territory was organized, facilitated by the gradual nature of the retreat and improved cooperation between military and civil authorities. 25 The Russians captured only one-fifth of the province, but their occupation lasted for three and a half months. It was not until the "Winter Battle" of mid-February 1915 that two German armies, attacking Sievers's flanks in the north and south, forced him into a hurried retreat. 26 After this defeat, tsarist units trespassed only once more on East Prussian soil. On March 17, 1915, Russian columns advanced on the province's most northeasterly district of Memel, taking the town of the same name. The operation was brief: four days later, the raiders were thrown out by a German relief force led by the military governor of Königsberg.
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The Russian invasions caused immense disruption and destruction in East Prussia. According to official figures, 41,414 buildings were destroyed and another 60,000 damaged. 28 29 Looting and vandalism had also been widespread. In abandoned homes and shops, officials found "furniture and household appliances smashed, the linen ripped apart, all cupboards emptied, the beds chopped up and the down scattered, letters and other papers thrown about, walls damaged by shots fired in fun, windows and doors smashed, merchandise pointlessly wasted, and the rooms fouled with human excrement."
30 While the Russians were responsible for much of this, they were not the sole culprits. German soldiers were also caught thieving. 31 Refugees too caused enormous damage; law and order broke down so badly that in October 1914 special military courts were set up to dispense justice to civilians plundering in the war zone.
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While the material damage in much of East Prussia was obvious, it was not immediately clear how the province's inhabitants had fared at the hands of the invaders. Was there any truth in the atrocity stories that had begun to circulate in the panic of August 1914? Officials, confronted by chaos, were unable to answer this question quickly. The population was displaced, infrastructure was damaged, and the administration needed time to regain control. It would take many months for painstaking investigations to establish the full extent of the invader's violence against civilians. 
II
The German government was not complacent when reports of Russian atrocities began to arrive from East Prussia. Already in August 1914 it had issued a diplomatic protest and opened inquiries to ascertain whether tsarist troops had broken international laws of war. 33 Under the Hague Convention of 1907, signed by Germany and Russia, civilians possessed some, albeit limited, protection.
34
Pillaging was strictly forbidden. The convention stipulated too that "the lives of persons . . . must be respected" and that "undefended" places should not be subjected to attack or bombardment. Belligerents were allowed neither to force enemy subjects to participate in operations against their own country nor to impose collective punishments in retribution for the crimes of individuals.
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Civilians also had obligations, however. Most importantly, the right of resistance was severely limited: inhabitants were permitted to rise up "spontaneously" only if their territory was not yet occupied, and arms had to be carried openly. 36 The incentives for proving that Russian forces had contravened the convention without provocation were twofold. First, there was a financial motivation to catalog damages and identify who had caused them, as Article 3 of the convention obliged belligerents whose troops violated its provisions to pay compensation. 37 Second, demonstrating Russian brutality in East Prussia was a useful weapon in the diplomatic war to gain neutrals' sympathy. It offered a riposte to the Entente's damaging accusations of German barbarity in Belgium and France. 40 It may not be coincidental that the minister issued his first order on the day that an official Belgian commission produced its first report on German atrocities. 41 Nonetheless, the correspondence between provincial authorities and Berlin makes it clear that the investigation was intended to be thorough and objective. The county presidents were told to appoint not only local officials but also "distinguished personages not in state service . . . , who are fully acquainted with the circumstances of the district." 42 There was no intention of using evidence of Russian crimes to incite public outrage; the authorities refused requests by private persons and commercial publishers for information on tsarist troops' brutality precisely because they feared that it would be exploited for sensationalist or pornographic purposes. 43 Rigor was essential. The commissions' findings would face international scrutiny and needed to be irrefutable. 44 The three county presidents submitted their findings in the autumn of 1914. Although the reports differed in length and in their use of evidence, they un- animously agreed that the invading forces had perpetrated serious crimes against the East Prussian population. The first report was sent from Gumbinnen to the interior minister on September 25. Drawing predominantly on witness testimony and making no claim to be comprehensive, it recounted beatings, murders, and executions, as well as massacres in the villages of Seedranken and Christiankehmen. Civilians who had refused to betray German troops' positions had been harmed or even killed. While the most serious cases were confirmed in their essentials by subsequent investigation, the report's reliance on apparently unverified individuals' statements resulted in the inclusion of several far-fetched and poorly supported accounts of women, children, and soldiers having been sadistically mutilated. 45 The report provided no estimate of total civilian victims. A press release published around the same time suggests, however, that officials believed more than 360 civilian lives had been lost in Gumbinnen County. 46 The other two counties reported one month later, at the end of October. Königsberg sent only a short note that, while not detailing how evidence had been compiled, did summarize the investigation's conclusions in measured tones. It refused to endorse accounts of mutilation and acknowledged a case in which a Russian soldier had been shot dead by his officer in punishment for the attempted rape and murder of East Prussian civilians. It nonetheless stated categorically that the invaders had killed over 200 people in the county "without cause."
47 Allenstein's report was the most thorough and transparent, systematically detailing the atrocities perpetrated, district by district. It not only recounted witness statements but also cited the testimony of policemen, foresters, teachers, and priests, upstanding local officials who either had remained at their posts during the invasion or were first on the scene after liberation. 48 The research for the report's section on 45 Gumbinnen County report, September 25, 1914. AP Olsztyn: OP Ostpreußen: 3/528, fols. 64-79. Gause's postwar investigation supported much of the information given in the report onkillingsat Seedranken ðfol. 69Þ,nearSzittkehmenðfol. 71Þ, and inChristiankehmen ðfol. 78Þ. See Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 212, 160, and 188-89. The mutilation testimony was largely rejected as unconvincing by the authorities: it is significant that a document on Russian atrocities compiled from the three county reports by the Oberpräsident's office excluded most of it. See Lyck, the county's most severely affected district, was especially impressive. The district gendarmerie, men who knew their localities intimately, had conducted extensive investigations very shortly after the liberation; one officer recounted how he himself had located and buried victims' bodies. This enabled them as early as September to submit detailed reports showing that 127 men, women, and children from the district had been killed and around 315 forcibly taken by tsarist troops. 49 Overall, the county report gave details of more than 300 cases of murder by Russian soldiers. Some killings were apparently random, some were related to robbery, and others were executions. Men of military age were numerous among the victims. A few male corpses were found damaged, although probably not malevolently. Female fatalities were far rarer but some were reported, as were sexual assaults. There were accounts of massacres, notably near the town of Bischofstein and in the village of Santoppen. The report also asserted that nearly 400 people had been forcibly deported. These estimates were later raised to 600 killed and 1,000 deported.
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The county commissions convincingly demonstrated that many German civilians had been killed by Russian troops in August and September 1914. 51 Nonetheless, the interior minister was not satisfied. The reports had failed to establish that the bloodshed had contravened international law. It was not sufficient, he argued, to state that "a house was burned down or a number of inhabitants shot"; it also had to be shown that "those shot had not behaved in a hostile manner toward the Russians, that there was no military reason for destroy- 50 Allenstein County report entitled "Auszüge aus den Akten der Kriegskommission Allenstein zur Untersuchung Völkerrechtswidriger russischer Grausamkeiten," October 29, 1914. AP Olsztyn: OP Ostpreußen: 3/528, fols. 43-63. The original typewritten totals given on fol. 62 ðwhich, in the case of the killed, tallies with the cases detailed in the reportÞ were written over with new raised estimates in pencil. 51 The commissions' conclusions were supported by the Evangelical Church in East Prussia. Reports from its clergy led it to conclude that "at least 500 civilians" had been killed, and "at least as many carried off to Russia." See report of Königliches Konsistorium der Provinz Ostpreußen to Evangelischer Ober-Kirchenrat in Berlin-Charlottenburg, October 23, 1914. GStA, Berlin: I. HA Rep. 90A, 1059, p. 4 of report.
ing the place." Moreover, he stressed that in order to ensure reliability, testimony needed to be taken under oath. 52 From early November the courts were therefore directed to assist the commissions, and despite the onset of the second invasion sworn statements were collected from victims and witnesses during the winter and through to the autumn of 1916. 53 A small selection of this evidence formed the basis of a long-awaited but disappointing Foreign Office report on "Atrocities of Russian Troops against German Civilians and German Prisoners of War," published in March 1915. Despite the faith placed in sworn testimony, this "White Book" included some dubious mutilation stories, omitted many of the worst examples of the invader's violence, and failed to state how many East Prussians had suffered or lost their lives at Russian hands. It was a poor reflection of the work undertaken by the province's administration. 54 In April 1915, only a month after the appearance of the "White Book," East Prussian authorities were, by contrast, able to supply comprehensive casualty estimates. Probably collated by district administrators ðLandräteÞ, these stated that 1,615 civilians had been killed by the Russians since the war's outbreak. 55 An even larger number had been forcibly deported. The tsar's government itself admitted in the autumn of 1915 to holding 7,000 East Prussians, claiming rather incredibly that they had chosen to settle in Russia. 56 The district administrators had already calculated in the spring and summer that 10,685 people had been taken. 57 A detailed investigation completed in the war's second half found the total to be higher still. The Verschlepptenlisten, thick tomes containing deportees' names, ages, and places of origin, registered 1,133 people from Königsberg 55 See the tables for Königsberg and Allenstein Counties in "Besichtigung der durch die Russeneinfällen beschädigten Teile der Provinz Ostpreußen durch die Minister ½Staatsministerium," ca. April 1915. A report by the county president in Gumbinnen in the same file estimated that 418 civilians had lost their lives there. However, further inquiries had raised this figure to 451 by the summer, and it is this figure that is used to calculate the above total. See GStA, Berlin: I. HA Rep. 90A, 1064, and, for the Gumbinnen The deportation of civilians was only debatably a war crime, as such action had not been foreseen or forbidden by the 1907 Hague Convention. The German administration appears to have accepted that fit men liable for military service could legitimately be arrested and removed in order to stop them from joining their country's army upon liberation. 59 Additionally, occupiers were obliged by the Hague Convention to "ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety," and it could be argued that this goal was facilitated by the removal of potentially rebellious elements from the territory. 60 Many of the deported seem highly unlikely to have fallen into this category, however: almost half of those taken were women and children. 61 Infants of six weeks and people of over eighty years were among the deportees. 62 The conditions in which they were removed certainly contravened the convention's demand that occupiers should respect "the lives of persons, and private property." Superintendent Skierlo, a seventy-four-year-old clergyman from the town of Johannisburg who was deported in February 1915, recorded the inefficiency and corruption that he encountered during his almost three-week journey to Simbirsk on the Volga. The Russian authorities had prepared little in advance, and much of the prisoners' time was spent in anxious waiting. When a cattle wagon was eventually supplied for an eight-day rail trip, it contained only hard wooden boards on which to sleep and no toilet or bucket for 58 washing. Food was scant and money intended for the prisoners was stolen by their guards. Two old men and a child died en route. The worst of the experience ended once the deportees began their internment in Simbirsk, but life remained hard. Skierlo was only one of over 4,000 East Prussians, nearly one-third of those deported, who never saw Germany again and died in captivity. 63 The broad accuracy of the statistics for civilian fatalities and deportations collected by the East Prussian authorities is confirmed by Dr. Fritz Gause's study of the invasions, which he undertook in the conflict's aftermath ðtable 1Þ. He put the number of people deported to Russia slightly higher, at 13,566 East Prussians, basing this estimate mainly on official figures that were later published in the press. 64 His major achievement, however, was to refine the wartime data on those killed, using material, now lost, that had been collected by the Provinzialkommission für ostpreußische Kriegsgeschichte ðProvincial commission for East Prussian war historyÞ. This organization had been established in September 1915 at the behest of the senior president of East Prussia. Led by Professor Albert Brackmann, its task was to preserve the memory of the invasions and gather information to facilitate writing their history. At its request, over the winter of 1915-16, thousands of teachers across East Prussia interviewed locals and wrote chronicles of their communities' experiences during the invasions, organized according to a schema laid down by the commission. These chronicles were subjected to rigorous checks and were added to by both parish and district committees before being deposited with the Provincial Commission. 65 Gause used the results of this enormous civic effort to correct official estimates for civilian fatalities. Significantly, by eliminating double counting and accidental deaths in the fighting, he revised the official figures downward-a good indication of his scholarly integrity. His painstaking research concluded that 1,491 East Prussians had been killed deliberately by the Russians. 66 64 Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 246 and 359, endnote 37. Gause not only used the press reports but also consulted the provincial documentation from which the figures originated. 65 Gause, "Quellen zur Geschichte des Russeneinfalls," 90-96. Most of these chronicles are lost, along with the other papers of the Provinzialkommission für Ostpreußische Kriegsgeschichte. Only a small remnant from the districts of Johannisburg and Insterburg survives in GStA, Berlin under the catalog reference XX. HA, Rep. 235. 66 While killings and deportations could be calculated with reasonable accuracy, the incidence of a third type of atrocity, sexual assault, was more difficult to establish due to victims' reluctance to report the crime. 67 The Foreign Office's "White Book" accused Russian troops of committing "countless . . . bestial rapes," stating that victims included heavily pregnant women, the aged, and a minor. 68 This claim may not have been purely cynical propaganda; an internal report by the president of Gumbinnen County from February 1915 asserted that rapes had been frequent and "in part . . . quite systematically prepared" during the second invasion. 69 While it soon became apparent that this was an exaggeration, the figure of ninety-eight sexual assaults that was ultimately accepted by provincial authorities is clearly far too low. Based on responses to a questionnaire cir-67 For reluctance to report rapes, see the statements by Pfarrer Krix and Freiherr von Mirbach in Allenstein County report, October 29, 1914. AP Olsztyn: OP Ostpreußen: 3/528, fols. 46 and 57. Gause provided no estimate for rapes, stating only that the number was not "excessively large" given the size of Russian forces in East Prussia. Reflecting contemporary racist prejudices, he nonetheless argued that Russians were more inclined than men of western nations to commit the crime. See Gause figures that he corrected were taken from a volume, now destroyed, entitled "Listen der getöteten Ostpreußen" kept in the papers of the stellvertretendes Generalkommando des I. Armeekorps. As the information in this volume had been originally supplied by the Landräte of East Prussia, it was probably similar or identical to the statistics given to the ministerial delegation in April 1915 cited in this article. culated among evangelical clergymen, it made no allowance for unreported incidents, omitted the province's Catholic minority, and ignored the returns of ministers who had given no number but had stated that many sexual assaults had been committed. 70 The figure also does not tally with what is known about pregnancies resulting from rape by tsarist troops. Thirty-seven so-called Russian children were receiving state support by May 1917, and the authorities knew of another eleven who had either been stillborn or had since died. 71 It is highly improbable that almost half of all rapes led to pregnancies. 72 More credible, therefore, are the estimates supplied by the district administrators, which together suggest that a minimum of 338 sexual assaults were perpetrated by Russian soldiers during the invasions.
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The provincial authorities' investigations left no doubt that East Prussians had suffered during the Russian invasions. Their detailed inquiries produced copious evidence of murder, rape, and mass deportations. Some officials, deeply shocked by the violence, reached for historical analogies to contextualize it; the tsar's soldiers were accused of behaving "exactly in the manner usual in the Thirty Years' War" and likened to "the Tatars who, for the last time 250 years ago, devastated this province."
74 This was hyperbole. More important are the questions of why these Russian atrocities took place, and how far they resembled those perpetrated contemporaneously by the German army in Belgium and northern France. 
III
The Russian army of 1914 was in structure, ethos, and political importance not so different from its German opponent. Like the Wilhelmine and, indeed, the Habsburg armies, it occupied a privileged position in the imperial state, isolated from civilian control and owing direct fealty to the monarch. The armies' basic assumptions and standard operating procedures were also not dissimilar. Despite the need to function across an empire stretching over two continents, the tsarist force, as planning for the East Prussian campaign revealed, suffered from something of the same disregard for logistical realities, myopic faith in the decisiveness of willpower in combat, and inability to match operational ambitions to available resources as did its German opponent. 75 Nor, as its long history of colonial campaigning on the Black Sea and in Asia prove, did the tsar's army have anything to learn from its western neighbor about instrumentalizing civilians. Its leaders shared their German counterparts' deep reluctance to accept civilian resistance as legitimate-an attitude that the army's suppression of the Russian revolution of 1905 can only have reinforced.
76 There were, of course, important differences as well. The Russian officer corps lacked the cohesion and doctrinal unity of its Prussian counterpart, and unit discipline was more varied, leading to weak "linkages" that impeded the force's operational command and coordination. 77 It also had no traumatic institutional memory of battle with francs-tireurs, despite considerable experience of irregular warfare. Nonetheless, tsarist officers possessed their own bugbears and bogeymen, stemming in large part from a fateful preoccupation with ethnicity, especially after 1905. Their training, which placed much emphasis on military geography and statistics, had institutionalized an understanding of populations as composed of different ethnic "elements," each of which possessed its own specific qualities. Ethnicity became equated with reliability. 78 The consequent expectations greatly affected Russian soldiers' and officers' propensity to perpetrate atrocities when they went to war in 1914.
Recent research has recognized the imperial Russian army's potential for radical violence against civilians, identifying deportation as its most distinctive feature. The force's experience of this type of operation went as far back as the 75 1860s, when it had bloodily expelled from the Caucasus hundreds of thousands of people belonging to ethnicities that were considered hostile. 79 At the opening of the First World War, new "Regulations for Field Administration of the Army in Wartime" granted it almost unlimited powers over civil populations in the war zone, including the authority to deport individuals or groups. 80 It used this right extensively: although Isabel Hull has pointed to the German army's deportations of at least 23,000 Belgian and French civilians in the first weeks of hostilities as evidence of its exceptional control mania, calling the practice "a more perfect way to achieve order," these actions were dwarfed by those of the Russian force. Around 300,000 enemy expatriates and ðeven before the "Great Retreat" of 1915Þ hundreds of thousands of Russian-subject Germans and Jews were uprooted within the tsarist empire. On the Caucasian front, 10,000 Russian-subject Muslims were forcibly removed at the start of that year. Deportations were also an important part of the Russian strategy in occupied Galicia, where 50,000 Habsburg Jews were moved around the crownland and another 20,000 to 30,000 compelled to leave for Russia in the first half of 1915.
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In East Prussia too, deportation was a defining characteristic of Russian invasion and occupation: its victims numbered nine times those killed in the invasions. Analysis reveals that the practice did not remain static. Only aggregate figures survive, but comparison of data from districts overrun once and those overrun twice testifies to a process of radicalization. In the first invasion, victims of deportation were overwhelmingly men: all but ten of the 724 inhabitants deported from the eleven districts of Königsberg County that were lost to the Russians in August and September 1914 were adult males. Similarly, 593 of 608 people removed from the six districts of Allenstein County invaded only in the same months were men. 82 Many were of military age and were taken to stop them from joining the German army. Others had been accused of spying, sabotage, or resistance, and some unfortunates were impressed with their wagons into enemy supply columns and then forced to retreat with the Russians. 83 Districts that were reinvaded after the autumn of 1914, by contrast, lost large numbers of women and children. In Lyck, Johannisburg, and Lötzen, the three districts of Allenstein County that had been invaded in the summer and then partially or entirely reoccupied from November 1914 until February 1915, 372 women and 716 children were taken, almost one-third of the 3,535 deportees. Among the 472 people herded back to Russia during the Memel raid in March 1915, a majority ð289Þ were women and children. 84 The president of Gumbinnen County confirmed the unprecedentedly extensive, although haphazard, nature of deportations in the second invasion. He estimated that over 30 percent of people who had not evacuated the occupied areas had been removed. In the north of the county, whole communities had disappeared. 85 The expansion of deportations from encompassing predominantly adult males to, in some cases, including whole communities was made possible by the static warfare of the second invasion. This enabled the Russians to develop sophisticated logistical networks, facilitating the transportation of large numbers of people. It also allowed the captured territory to be comprehensively looted and the stolen goods moved: the plundering in the winter of 1914-15 was far more systematic, militarily organized, and thorough than that of the summer. 86 More important, however, the radicalization of deportation practices in East Prussia during the autumn and winter of 1914 was part of a wider set of policy shifts within the tsarist empire. In this period, the internment of enemy subjects in Russia's military-governed western provinces, which had begun with healthy military-aged males but quickly encompassed women and children as well, drastically expanded. An even more extraordinary step was taken in the last months of 1914, when ethnic German subjects of the tsar were also expelled from these territories. Significantly, the same commanders were involved in both internal deportations and those in occupied areas. In November, the month that his army invaded East Prussia, General Sievers ordered the expulsion of all enemy subjects from the Riga District and Kurland Province of Russia. Whether similar plans were formulated for East Prussia is unknown; a surviving order from Sievers suggests that he initially intended to sweep German men toward enemy lines, not collect them and their families for transportation to Russia. 87 If an order for extensive deportations was later issued, it was implemented inconsistently; as on other fronts, confusion, indecision, and local considerations may have affected the timing and thoroughness with which the populations of different areas were removed. Nonetheless, the trend in East Prussia, as elsewhere in the winter of 1914-15, was clearly toward more total deportation, driven by the tsarist army's chief of staff, General N. N. Ianushkevich, and its commander in chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich.
88
The Russian military did not limit itself to moving people by force. It also deliberately killed civilians, particularly during the war's opening campaigns. Historians have not yet fully unraveled the dynamics behind this violence, which was highly diverse, encompassing at different times and places military executions and massacres, semiauthorized pogroms, and panic-induced bloodshed, as well as actions by individuals or ill-disciplined small groups. Crucially, it was shaped, like the German atrocities in the west, fundamentally by the preconceptions with which the army entered the war. As Peter Holquist has pointed out, military-statistical studies had already been prepared in peacetime by the tsarist army to predict how peoples living in territories over which it might fight would behave. These assessments proved highly important in determining the severity with which Russian invaders treated these different ethnicities in 1914. 89 A comparative glance at the tsarist army's conduct toward Ukrainians and Jews in Habsburg Galicia illustrates this point. In Galicia, Ukrainians were perceived by the army as "Russian peasants," and prewar military assessments expected 87 See the captured Russian order reproduced in Auswärtiges Amt, Greueltaten russischer Truppen, annex 81. This indicates that Sievers had been commanded by the chief of staff of the Northwestern Front Armies on November 21, 1914 ðRussian calendarÞ to push all healthy male enemy subjects of ten years old and older toward German lines. Cf. also Sievers's announcement warning East Prussian men of working age to leave or be taken prisoner, published in Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 83-84. 88 See Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire, 122-37, and Prusin, Nationalizing a Borderland, 48-54. them to welcome tsarist troops as liberators. In reality, these peasants were separated by both language and Uniate faith from the Russians, inconvenient facts that prompted tsarist authorities to launch an intrusive and counterproductive campaign of cultural assimilation against them during the occupation-yet they were generally not targets of military violence during the 1914-15 invasion. Austrian officials considered them to have been "well treated." 90 The Jews of Galicia were, by contrast, victimized. The tsar's army was fiercely antisemitic. It held Jews to be materialistic, selfish, and cowardly; they were thought too unmartial to pose a physical threat, but prewar studies did predict that they could "serve both sides, both by supplying goods but also by spying." 91 These stereotypes, which at first encouraged contempt rather than fear, shaped Russian brutality toward Jewish communities in the opening weeks of the invasion. Pogroms, often carried out by unruly and virulently antisemitic Cossack units, were its main manifestation. Unlike German atrocities, this wild and unstructured violence had no military function, although claims that Jewish girls had shot at Russian troops were sometimes used to excuse it. 92 It was motivated instead by a desire to humiliate, rape, and plunder. Reports compiled by a Jewish welfare activist who toured eastern Galicia in 1916, Dr. Bernard Hausner, and by local Habsburg officials and gendarmes record numerous beatings and sexual assaults, as well as massive theft and material destruction. Some victims did die, but killing was not the perpetrators' principal aim, and this early violence consequently appears to have been less lethal than the reprisals and punishments meted out by military command in places where-as in Belgium, France, and, as will be explained, East Prussia-populations were considered to be active threats. Mounting spy hysteria soon kindled fears that Jews were damaging the army, however, and this, along with Ianushkevich's fanatical antisemitism, increased the troops' viciousness and prompted the introduction of radical official countermeasures. The mass deportations that began in 1915, intended both as security precautions and as preemptive reprisals, were carried out with great callousness. These deportations and the Russians' final brutal retreat probably cost more human lives than the pogroms of the war's first weeks. The killings perpetrated by the Russian army in East Prussia had much more in common, both quantitatively and qualitatively, with German atrocities in the west than with the comparatively mild treatment of Ukrainians or the initial "wild" violence meted out to Galician Jews. Analysis of available fatality statistics reveals that the extent of the bloodshed was remarkably similar in the two campaigns. The absolute numbers of victims of military violence were, of course, far lower in East Prussia than in Belgium and northern France: 1,491 as against 6,427 deaths. Significantly, however, if fatalities are placed in proportion to the peacetime populations of the areas overrun, it becomes clear that the intensity of the violence was closely comparable. A little over 1.7 million people lived in the districts of East Prussia captured by Russian troops, of whom 0.086 percent was killed. 94 The regions of Belgium and France taken by the German army up to mid-September 1914 were inhabited by 8.3 million people, 0.078 percent of whom were killed. 95 In Belgian areas alone the fatality rate was greater, reaching 94 The peacetime population of areas that came into contact with Russian troops be- Archives for the History of the Jewish People, Jerusalem: HM2-9177 ðoriginals held in Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukrainy, L'viv: fond 146 opis 4Þ. I am grateful to Dr. Tim Buchen for alerting me to the existence of these valuable sources. They indicate that fatalities were less heavy at Russian troops' entry into Galicia, despite the frequent pogroms, than later on in the invasion. Still, it should be noted that the early "wild violence" did include some extremely bloody incidents. In Nadwórna, seven women died after being raped in early September 1914. Among the other twenty-two inhabitants killed during the shtetl's ten-month occupation, some may also have been slaughtered at this time. The notorious Lwów pogrom of September 27, 1914, caused up to forty-seven fatalities. See ibid., fols. 14 and 59, and, for Lwów, Christoph Mick, Kriegserfahrungen in einer multiethnischen Stadt: Lemberg 1914-1947 ðWiesbaden, 2010Þ, 105-6. Also, more generally, Prusin, Nationalizing a Borderland, 26-32 and 48-59, and Holquist, "Role of Personality," 61-67. 0.13 percent of the peacetime population. 96 This was attributable less to any uniquely German propensity for brutality, however, than to the comparative abundance of military-aged males among the Belgian civilian populace at the war's opening. In both east and west, males aged between nineteen and forty-five years old were most likely to be the victims of invading armies' suspicion and aggression. As Belgium, unlike Germany, operated no system of universal conscription, the size of its target population was far larger than that of East Prussia. 97 The importance of this factor is highlighted by the abrupt drop in killings after the kaiser's army crossed into France, where the draft was even more thorough than in Germany. Although the peacetime population there was double that of the districts of East Prussia that were invaded, "only" 906 civilians were killed-far fewer than the number of East Prussians who died at Russian hands. 98 The timing of tsarist military killings also corresponds with that of the German violence in Belgium and France. The overwhelming majority of civilian deaths in East Prussia happened in the first invasion, in August and September 1914. In Königsberg County, all but the seventy-three civilian fatalities of the Memel raid took place in these months. In Allenstein County, at least four-fifths, and probably almost all, civilian deaths date from the same period. Estimating casualties in Gumbinnen County is more difficult, but widespread reports of violence and the experience of the other two counties make it highly likely that there too the majority of killings took place in the first invasion. The predominance of fatalities in this first invasion is not solely attributable to the greater extent of the Russians' advance. The tsarist army was, in this earlier campaign, more ready than it was later to kill civilians. In Lyck, for example, which was overrun in both attacks, 127 of the district's inhabitants were killed in August or September 1914, while only seven died at Russian hands during the occupation in the autumn and winter of 1914-15. The Russians' violence in East Prussia was motivated, like that of the kaiser's military in Belgium and France, primarily by fears of facing a "people's war." The peacetime military-statistical studies had primed tsarist commanders to regard the province's populace as far more dangerous than that of Galicia, for ethnic Germans, unlike Jews or Ukrainians, were predicted to be hostile. Consequently, in contrast to the "wild" violence dominating the first weeks of the campaign in the Habsburg lands, which at least some senior Russian commanders tried to rein in, much of the bloodshed in East Prussia was from the outset militarily purposeful, intended to punish and deter civilian resistance. 100 Already on August 18, General Rennenkampf issued a proclamation warning that opposition would be "ruthlessly punished, regardless of gender or age." Places where "even the smallest attack on the Russian army is perpetrated" were to be "immediately burned to the ground."
101 Less senior officers repeated these threats, exacted war levies, demanded hostages, and took other precautions to avoid ambush; in one village, the inhabitants were made to stand with raised hands while troops marched past.
102
Lower ranks were similarly nervous and feared being poisoned by civilians. March 1915. Only Königsberg County is relatively uncomplicated, as-with the exception of Memel District, which escaped attack until March 1915-it was overrun only during the first invasion. For the two other counties, Allenstein and Gumbinnen, detailed fatality statistics from Allenstein probably give the best indication of how the violence was distributed. According to Gause, 587 civilians were killed in the county's nine rural districts ðLandkreiseÞ. Of these killings, 358 took place in the six districts invaded once in August and September 1914. For Lyck, which was invaded twice, detailed gendarmerie records indicate that 127 of the district's 134 fatalities took place in the first invasion. Therefore, at least 485 of Allenstein County's total 587 killings ð83 percentÞ happened in the first invasion. In Johannisburg and Lötzen, the other two districts in the county that faced two invasions, it is highly likely that their seventy-four and twenty-one fatalities also mainly happened during the first assault. Landrat reports written after the two districts' liberation from the second invasion indicate that large numbers of killings had this time not been reported. More gruesome rumors of inhabitants mutilating men, similar to those that spread within the German army in the west, may also have circulated: an official Russian complaint made after the invasion prompted East Prussian authorities to exhume the bodies of six enemy officers and men buried in the district of Friedland in order to disprove accusations that civilians had stabbed out their eyes and cut off their ears.
104
In East Prussia as in western Europe, the fluid fighting that characterized the war's early campaigns soon created circumstances appearing to confirm military expectations of civilian resistance. Tsarist troops frequently collided with small enemy patrols camouflaged by field grey uniforms and firing smokeless munitions from concealed positions. When such clashes took place in a village or town, it was all too easy for Russian soldiers, suffering casualties but unable to identify the source of shooting, to conclude that they were being attacked by the inhabitants. In Gause's estimation, such misapprehensions cost over 200 lives, about one-seventh of all civilian fatalities in East Prussia. 105 They helped to provoke some of the worst massacres in the province. Around the town of Bischofstein on August 29, for example, thirty-six people were killed by the Russians after a six-man German infantry patrol fired on enemy troops attacking the town's railway station and then hurriedly dispersed. A gendarmerie inquiry conducted in the aftermath argued that the Russians "must have suspected the civilians of being either soldiers in disguise or treacherous." 106 The bloodiest single incident of the invasion, the massacre of sixty-one people in the village of Abschwangen on the same day, appears to have been a reprisal for the shooting of a tsarist officer by a German patrol, mistakenly attributed by the Russians to enemy civilians. 107 A similar misapprehension led to the bombardment of the town of Neidenburg on August 22. Cossack cavalry entering Neidenburg were ambushed by German cycle troops; the Cossacks' corps commander, believing his men to have been shot at by the citizens, fired three hundred shells into the town as a punishment. 108 As in these cases, there was generally little evidence that civilians other than uniformed gendarmerie, foresters, and customs officials had resisted the enemy during the invasion. German investigations found only isolated instances of defiance-hardly surprising, as East Prussians had been emphatically warned against taking such actions by their authorities. 109 Nonetheless, the Russians clearly believed civilian opposition to be widespread. It was considered sufficiently problematic to prompt the intervention of the army commander in chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich: on September 2, he ordered that any habitation whose populace fired upon troops should suffer "complete destruction." 110 The tsarist army's imaginary "people's war" was not identical to that of its German opponent, however. The Russian force lacked the same traumatic memories of fighting francs-tireurs, and the focus of its officers' obsessive fears was therefore less the civilian guerrilla than the spy. 111 The commander of the First Cavalry Division, Vasily Gurko, remembered that "from the first days of the campaign it was clear to us that the Germans were employing every conceivable method of obtaining information." He believed that inhabitants were passing intelligence to their own side, that youths on bicycles were performing reconnaissance missions, and that espionage was being conducted by soldiers who, although disguised as peasants, were fortunately identifiable by their militaryissue underwear. The local population was even thought sufficiently fanatic to set alight its own farm buildings in order to signal the advance of Russian troops to German forces. 112 As General Iurii N. Danilov, the tsarist army's quartermastergeneral, later confirmed, the conviction that inhabitants were tracking units with bicycles and reporting their movements by lighting fires, ringing bells, or starting windmills was ubiquitous: "those who participated in the East Prussian operations," he recorded, "testify unanimously to the excellent organization of the support given to ½German troops by the German population." 113 Such suspicions were based on little but fantasy; even where invaders' movements were reported to the German military, this was almost entirely due to impromptu action by postal agents, not members of the public or organized spy rings. 114 The Russians' delusions nonetheless often had lethal consequences for the occupied population. Men caught with military papers or pieces of army clothing, not unusual in a society with peacetime conscription, were frequently executed. Some appear to have been killed simply because they were of military age. 115 Cyclists were especially targeted: one Rössel gendarme observed in his postinvasion report that "the many cyclists ½whom the Russians met on the street had their bicycles broken up without ceremony and they themselves were also for the most part shot." 116 Gause estimated that they comprised a full 5 percent of the victims of Russian atrocities. 117 The tsarist army's preoccupation with spies was reflected in a pattern of violence significantly different from that of the Germans in Belgium and France. "Major incidents," defined by Horne and Kramer as atrocities with ten or more deaths, accounted for 80 percent of fatalities in the west, principally because franc-tireur scares tended to provoke panic and mass reprisals. 118 In contrast, individuals, not communities, were usually punished for espionage. Only one massacre in East Prussia, the killing of twenty-one people at Santoppen on August 28 after the village's church bells had been rung, was associated with signaling or espionage, and it may in fact have been prompted by shooting nearby earlier in the day. 119 Consequently, "major incidents" were much rarer in East Prussia: Gause's study recorded only twenty, in which 378 people were killed, 25 percent of the total civilian fatalities in the province. Most of the Russians' victims were executed individually or in small groups. throughout the army, preventing the inebriation that contributed to some German atrocities in the west. 126 Major massacres were also avoided owing to senior tsarist officers' unwillingness to act peremptorily. Insterburg, which served for several weeks as Rennenkampf's headquarters, was one city spared. On August 26, a report that a shot had been fired from one of the city's houses could have prompted a violent reaction; instead, however, a proclamation was issued warning inhabitants that repetitions would be punished by burning to the ground first any house that was the site of shooting, then any street, and finally the whole city. When there was an explosion two days later at the municipal waterworks, the Russians wrongly suspected sabotage, demanded more hostages, yet again abstained from bloodshed. Even on September 10, the day before the Russians withdrew and thus a particularly tense time, the army limited itself to burning down a factory from which revolver shots were said to have been fired. No one was killed. The discipline imposed by commanders along with, in some cases, their personal restraint goes far to explain why major cities survived the Russian invasion largely unscathed. There was no East Prussian equivalent of the Germans' notoriously bloody and destructive rampage in Louvain. 127 The presence of officers was, German officials agreed, a crucial factor preventing Russian indiscipline: "where Russian troops lay in large numbers under supervision less was, as a rule, devastated."
128 This was fortunate for cities but not for scattered villages in the countryside, where small bands of cavalry roamed unsupervised and committed acts of "wild" violence. According to East Prussia's clergy, it was they who had "stolen, robbed, murdered to their heart's content." 129 Cossacks, who were responsible for many of the pogroms in Galicia, were especially feared, but whether their behavior really was exceptionally rapacious in East Prussia is difficult to determine; antisemitism was not a factor here, and their training was, after all, identical to that of regular Russian cavalry. 130 The similarity of uniforms, the ferocious appearance of men after several days in the saddle, and the widely known Cossack reputation for brutality may have prompted civilians to assume any mounted soldier who committed atrocities to be a Cossack. 131 The violence of these unsupervised troops appears rarely to have been motivated by hatred or racism. The focus of the rank and file's ire was not ordinary Germans, but the kaiser; East Prussian officials frequently found that they had poked out the eyes in his official portraits or otherwise mutilated them. 132 Misunderstandings between troops and inhabitants may sometimes have led to aggression, but the knowledge of Polish possessed by many on both sides probably made this less of a problem, at least in the south of the province, than in Belgium and France. 133 Instead, the violence was often related to looting. To peasant-soldiers from impoverished rural Russia, East Prussia appeared spectacularly rich; even their officers were impressed with the "astonishing amount of rural wealth."
134 Moreover, the army's utterly inadequate logistical preparation for the campaign meant that troops were often hungry, and the need to requisition food offered an excuse to enter dwellings and then to steal, rape, or murder. 135 Finally, reverses on the battlefield greatly exacerbated violence both by small groups of soldiers and by larger units under officers. Samsonov's troops committed many of their worst atrocities in the confusion of the last days of Tannenberg. 136 The subsequent retreat of Rennenkampf 's army, which was far more traumatic than the almost contemporaneous but more limited German withdrawal in the west after the Entente victory on the Marne, was also bloody. The force's supply chain collapsed and discipline among the frightened and frustrated soldiers faltered. The chaos and danger further inflamed lethal delusions of civilian resistance. Half of all civilians killed in Gumbinnen District and more than threefifths in neighboring Darkehmen died during the retreat. It was the southeastern corner of the province that suffered most in terms of absolute numbers of fatalities, however. 137 Prostken, a small town of 3,000 people in Lyck District, illustrates how horrific the destruction could be in this period. Beginning on September 8, and continuing through the night, the town was plundered by retreating Russian troops, assisted by Polish civilians from across the border. All but eight houses were demolished. Property and livestock were taken; some inhabitants were forced to drive their own cattle and horses into Russia. People were deported ð272Þ or massacred ðnineteenÞ; the rest of the citizens fled. All that was left on liberation, reported the local gendarme, was "a pile of rubble." 138 Examination of Russian violence in East Prussia in 1914-15 reveals German atrocities in Belgium and northern France at the war's opening to be much less exceptional than is usually claimed. For the tsarist army, like its German enemy, preconceptions of civilian hostility were crucial in engendering violence. As in the west, those preconceptions received apparent confirmation through the disorientating conditions of modern mobile combat. Soldiers and junior officers in both forces reacted with bloody reprisals, sanctioned by higher commanders. The two armies' fantasies and conduct were not identical: the tsarist army's greater fear of spies than of francs-tireurs, the restraint of some of its senior officers, the marauding by unsupervised soldiers in the countryside, and a traumatic retreat all affected its patterns of violence. Nonetheless, Russian behavior in East Prussia offers little support for the view that the German military was unusually brutal. The incidence of civilian fatalities in the west was no greater than in East Prussia. Instead, the most significant distinction between Russian and German atrocities may lie in the greater dynamism and persistence of the tsarist force's bloodletting. The kaiser's army, for all its reputed tendency to embrace spiraling scripts of violence, rapidly overcame its delusions of francs-tireurs and had all but ceased attacks on Belgian and French civilians by the mid-autumn of 1914. Russia's military, by contrast, proved more dysfunctional, and more radical. Descending ever deeper into an obsessive and largely irrational spy fever, it reacted in the winter of 1914-15 by initiating the mass deportation, often in lethal conditions, of men, women, and children belonging to suspect populations.
IV
The Russian army's invasions of East Prussia, and the atrocities that it committed there, had a formative impact on Germans' understanding of what was at stake in the First World War. Already at the beginning of August 1914, after the tsar 137 Ibid., 217-19. 138 Reports by Fußgendarmerie-Wachtmeister Mattern I, September 21, 22, and 25, 1914. AP Olsztyn: RP Allenstein: 179, fols. 213-14 and 219-28. Also, for the figures of killed and deported, which differ from those in the gendarmerie reports, see Gause, Russen in Ostpreußen, 191. ordered his armies to mobilize against the Reich, Germans had rallied behind their government, convinced of the defensive nature of the struggle and determined not to "allow the soil of the Fatherland to be overrun and devastated by Russian regiments."
139 When, shortly afterward, East Prussia was invaded, the shock reverberated across the country. The fear, horror, and outrage felt were most famously expressed in the October 1914 appeal of ninety-three German intellectuals "To the Civilized World," which complained emotionally of "earth . . . saturated with the blood of women and children unmercifully butchered by the wild Russian troops." 140 The intensity of the emotions needs to be acknowledged, for they lay at the core of the patriotic and defensive solidarity mythologized as the "spirit of 1914." 141 They also account for the remarkably immediate, universal, and enduring popularity of Hindenburg after Tannenberg. So frightening were the invasions and atrocity stories that Germans revered him as a "savior," an image that remained central to his cult during and long after the conflict. 142 The trauma of East Prussia's invasion was transmitted through several channels to the wider German populace in 1914. The press was critically important in disseminating news of Russian assault. Ingrained stereotypes of Russia as uncultured, barbaric, and Asiatic had primed newspapers to expect that invasion from the east would be brutal; Social Democratic papers, for example, predicted already on August 1, 1914, at the opening of hostilities with Russia, that the "motley peoples of the tsar" would be unlikely to keep to civilized norms of warfare. "We do not want our women and children to become victims of Cossack bestiality," they warned.
143 Nonetheless, once Russian attacks on East Prussia began, the German press's reporting was far more balanced than most historians have supposed. 144 In August, atrocity stories were published only sporadically and generally appeared in letters from the front written by private individuals, not in articles backed by journalistic authority. 145 Far from being inventions of official propaganda, the state suppressed such accounts as the attack developed. Theodor Wolff, editor of the influential Berliner Tageblatt, noted in his diary on August 25, "harrowing letters from East Prussia. Nothing allowed to be published."
146 Fear that atrocity stories would cause mass panic probably prompted the ban. Newspapers instead adopted a tone of forced optimism: "Good Outlook Also in the East" promised the Frankfurter Zeitung as the tsarist army advanced into East Prussia.
147 Information about the Russian attack was nonetheless sufficiently detailed and frightening to ensure that victory at Tannenberg was greeted with almost hysterical relief. On Berlin's Potsdamer Platz, Wolff witnessed on August 30 "unbelievable enthusiasm" as the extra edition reporting the triumph was snatched from vendors' hands, individuals were lifted up by the crowd to read it aloud, and thousands of people together celebrated the liberation.
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From September, once the threat posed by invasion had receded owing to Hindenburg's victories and more reliable information became available from the newly freed territory, newspapers were able to write extensively on Russian atrocities. 149 Drawing on prewar stereotypes of Russia, many commentators portrayed the violence as "the introduction of Asiatic barbarism onto German soil."
150 Nonetheless, their reports were far from wholly one-sided. The Deutsche Kriegszeitung, for example, which at the end of August had denounced tsarist 145 See the "letter of a German officer" as well as the summary of a similar private account of atrocities in the Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt 58. Jahrgang, Nr. 228, Erstes Morgenblatt ðAugust 18, 1914Þ, 2. These were originally published in the Berliner Tageblatt and the Hamburger Fremdenblatt. Editorial confidence in the veracity of these accounts was probably strengthened by Germany's official warning to the Russian government regarding the conduct of troops in East Prussia, notice of which appeared on the front page of the same day's Frankfurter Zeitung. troops as "robbers, murderers, and arsonists," acknowledged in mid-September that not all Russians were alike: the Cossacks, certainly, had been brutal, yet the typical guard officer was credited with "a breeding and fineness of conduct which would not allow him to look on the excesses of his subordinates quiescently." 151 The reports were frequently factually accurate; newspapers printed accounts by provincial officials well placed to explain the atrocities. The Frankfurter Zeitung used such testimony to report on Russian violence in Labiau, the bombardment of Neidenburg, and the Abschwangen massacre. 152 Magazines published sketches and photographs of fleeing civilians and ruined towns, assisting readers from other parts of Germany to empathize with the East Prussians' plight. 153 Press reports stressed that the invasions had endangered the entire nation: the suffering and sacrifices of the population in the province had been undergone, the public was told, "in the interest of the whole Fatherland." 154 Accounts of the violence in East Prussia were also disseminated through more personal channels. The units that fought in the province, although nominally local, contained high proportions of soldiers from other parts of Germany: over two-thirds of the men in the First Army Corps, for example, came from Westphalia and Brandenburg. 155 Through their letters, these troops passed on their shock at the destruction to relatives far removed from the fighting. "The war is very hard for our poor East Prussians," one war volunteer told his parents in Saxony at the end of August, describing for them the sight of burning farms, abandoned villages, and starving cattle. 156 Soldiers liberating the province sometimes found civilian corpses and, more frequently, heard from inhabitants of their suffering under the "devilish opponent." 157 Perhaps because they were traumatized by battle or projecting fears of mutilation or anxieties about their own masculinity, combatants were especially prone to exaggerate these accounts or invent wholly imaginary tales of Russian sadism toward women and children. 158 These stories traveled rearward, causing men not yet in action to expect enemy inhumanity and to interpret what they saw on the battlefield in this light. In Landwehr Infantry Regiment 76, for example, a unit recruited around Hamburg, troops were outraged by stories of Russians slicing off women's breasts and nailing down children even before they reached East Prussia at the end of August. 159 The vicarious experience of invasion was intensified by the fact that many Germans far removed from East Prussia not only read of but actually came face to face with victims of the Russian attacks. Large movements of civilians westward within Germany, although rarely mentioned in the historiography, were a defining part of the war experience in 1914. During the summer attack, more than 800,000 East Prussians fled their homes. 160 Most hid in local forests, headed for Königs-berg, or took their cattle and struggled across to neighboring West Prussia, but well over 30,000 traveled by rail over the Vistula to Berlin, Brandenburg, Pomerania, and beyond. 161 During the second invasion in November, the impact on the rest of the country was even greater as, assisted by a well-organized evacuation, a quarter of a million East Prussian refugees, out of a total of 350,000, spread across Germany. Chartered trains brought 34,000 to Pomerania, 21,000 to Schleswig, and 20,000 to both Lüneburg and Danzig. Another 25,000 went to Frankfurt an der Oder, 12,000 to Potsdam, and 6,000 across the country to Osnabrück. Most were accommodated with private persons, not isolated in barracks. A further 80,000 East Prussians used ordinary branch trains to reach safety, most going to Berlin or Westphalia. 162 These refugees were even more important than the press in disseminating accounts of Russian brutality; their claims that "the Russians had murdered women and children in East Prussia," tortured civilians, and burned habitations were already being passed by word of mouth and discussed across Germany from August 1914. 163 Not only refugees but also military evacuees from the east brought the invasion to central and western Germans. At the beginning of November 1914, with a second invasion looming, the Prussian War Ministry ordered that recruits not yet posted to units and the three premilitary year groups of seventeen-to nineteenyear-olds living in threatened areas on the eastern frontier should be removed to safety. The scale of this evacuation is today difficult to ascertain, but it was certainly substantial, for it embraced not only East Prussia but also parts of the border provinces of Posen, Silesia, and probably West Prussia. While some men were transported a relatively short distance into the interior of these provinces, many were taken to Brandenburg, Prussian Saxony, Pomerania, Hannover, and Schleswig Holstein. More than 17,000 were sent to the Province of HessenNassau in the west of Germany. 164 The measure was probably intended to avoid a repetition of the deportations of military-aged men undertaken by the Russians during their first incursion into East Prussia. Yet to an excited and anxious public, the movement of so many youths was a confirmation of more macabre fantasies about the invader's brutality. One rumor had it that the evacuation was necessitated by tsarist troops' practice of hacking off the hands of healthy German males.
The vicarious invasion transmitted to Germans through press reports, soldiers' letters, and firsthand contact with East Prussians united the populace behind their country's war effort in 1914. Yet the mobilizing potential of the experience ended neither with the celebrations and thanksgiving church services that marked the second liberation in February nor with the outrage provoked by the final Russian assault on Memel in March 1915. 172 Perpetuated by memoirs, histories, and even some best-selling novels and children's literature, as well as by the Ostpreußenhilfe, the memory and fear of invasion remained potent. 173 In the autumn of 1917, when war weariness, polarization over war aims, and disappointment at the U-boats' failure to achieve quick victory brought civilian morale to a nadir, the government sought to exploit this fear in order to renew public resolve. 174 The Seventh War Loan campaign took as its central theme the predatory objectives of the Reich's opponents and warned that failure to subscribe would lead to invasion, this time from the west. The propaganda illustrated the threat by recalling East Prussia's suffering at Russian hands in 1914-15: one leaflet reminded its readers of the "robbery, murder, arson, and rape" that had taken place in the province. Another, featuring a dramatic drawing of British cavalrymen beating and looting from German peasants that was strongly reminiscent of accounts of Cossack behavior in East Prussia, prompted its readers to imagine a future in which "German land should, as once in East Prussia, be laid waste and destroyed" ðfig. 2Þ. 175 Even a short film was made that drew on the northeasterly province's recent history in order to advertise the war loan. The drama showed a wealthy and contented farmer's family in East Prussia suddenly disturbed by the cry "the Russians are coming." As the staging directions explained: "Cossacks and Russians rush like animals into the village, burning and laying waste to everything in their path-the terrified inhabitants want to save themselves from the sea of flames-but mercilessly the Cossacks throw them back into the blazing fire, pull women and children onto the road and pitilessly knock down all who approach them to plead. . . . They pay no attention to the whimpering women-the screams for help of following children echo unceasingly in the ears." For Germans not wishing to see these scenes repeated in 1917, the message was clear: "Yes, we must support our Fatherland with money!" 176 Equally significantly, East Prussia also provided the inspiration for the major media event of 1917: the release of the motion picture Ostpreußen und sein Hindenburg ðEast Prussia and Its HindenburgÞ. A lavish costume drama produced at a time of severe textile shortages, the film required an army of extras and featured both the kaiser and Hindenburg. It was billed, justly, as "the greatest national sensation film of the present." 177 The film told a story of East Prussia, beginning with its heathen past and its cultural development by the Teutonic Knights. The German claim to the land having been established, the focus then switched to the Napoleonic period, the humiliations of 1806-7, and the triumphant liberation of Prussia from occupation in 1813. The final part, the film's "dramatic high point" in the opinion of one critic, then took the viewer into the province's most recent history. Accompanied by a stirring soundtrack, the screen displayed East Prussia's invasion in 1914 and the atrocities committed by the "Russian hordes." Far from exaggerating, these scenes were, according to an educationalist asked to comment on the picture, "too true to life." Yet, he continued, "these facts are now common knowledge, and we cannot allow ourselves to balk at looking these things in the face." The film ended on a high note, with the province's deliverance through the advance of Germany's victorious soldiers under Hindenburg. As they left the cinema, spectators should have been filled with the conviction that, just as East Prussia had passed through adversity in 1813 and 1914 and had been redeemed, so too Germany would hold out in its present struggle and its greatness would be resurrected. 178 almost half of whom were women and children, had been brutally ripped from their homes and deported into the depths of the tsar's empire. Only two-thirds of these deportees would survive their wartime captivity. The invasions had been accompanied by widespread looting and devastation. More than 100,000 buildings had been damaged or destroyed, most in heavy fighting but some as a result of military reprisals or after being plundered. East Prussia's few cities had escaped serious harm, but over one-quarter of its farms and villages and three-fifths of its small towns were scarred or ruined. 182 This "unheard-of brutality" was not so exceptional as the Reich's deputy chancellor Delbrück believed. Similar violence was in fact being committed contemporaneously against civilians by militaries all across Europe in 1914. Close structural parallels exist between Russian actions in East Prussia and the more famous German "atrocities." In both armies, preconceptions of civilian hostility formulated in peacetime were activated by the shock of modern, mobile warfare. Although patterns of violence differed, Russian, like German, troops responded aggressively and senior commanders authorized bloody reprisals and punishments. Moreover, while more research is needed, there are already strong indications that neither force was unusually brutal. The Austro-Hungarian army outmatched both its ally and its principal enemy in viciousness. It killed 3,500 Serbian civilians in the first weeks of war and perhaps 25,000-30,000 Ukrainians during its campaign in Galicia. 183 Nor was such bloodshed confined to the armed forces of conservative monarchies. The French Republic's military both shot and took hostage noncombatants during its brief occupation of Alsace-Lorraine. 184 Arguments seeking to place the atrocities of the kaiser's army in Belgium and northern France within a narrative of German exceptionalism are therefore much misguided. Violence against civilians was a European way of war in August 1914.
How then did these international atrocities of 1914 relate to the rest of Europe's bloody twentieth century? The tsarist force's brutality, more than that of its German opponent, does hint at some continuities with the exterminatory warfare practiced three decades later in central and eastern Europe. Its deportations can plausibly be set in a continuum stretching from imperial colonization practices to the punitive and security displacements ordered by Stalin in the Second World War. Moreover, Russian conduct, unlike that of the Germans, testifies to the murderous potential of racialized thinking already in the early twentieth century. Ethnic stereotyping made a crucial difference to the dynamics of violence that the recent focus on "military culture" has ignored or underplayed. In the German case, the imperial army's imaginary francs-tireurs were race-neutral. The delusion's indistinctness actually accentuated its danger initially, as not only French but also Belgian and even Polish and Jewish civilians fell victim to it, but it also enabled its rapid abandonment. 185 The tsarist army differed in imparting fixed racial characteristics to the spies that it so feared. This contributed to the persistence of that fear and encouraged radicalized countermeasures, culminating in the deportation of entire suspect communities. In 1914-15, it was the Russian military, not the kaiser's force, that more closely preempted the Nazi Wehrmacht's unstoppable scripts of irrational, racialized violence.
Even so, the parallels should not be drawn too closely. As Peter Holquist has argued, both structural and political checks, including government intervention as well as domestic and international criticism, prohibited any possible slide by the Russian army from deportation into genocide in 1915. 186 Moreover, the shedding of civilian blood on the battlefield in 1914, driven principally by fear, was everywhere still far from the ideologically fueled and hate-inspired killing of 1941-45. East Prussia's experience shockingly illustrates the latter's far greater lethality. The imperial Russian army's violence at the start of the First World War killed less than a tenth-or three-tenths if deportation fatalities are included-of a single percentage point of the province's population. The Soviet army's invasion of East Prussia in January 1945 involved, by contrast, a truly terrifying level of murder, rape, and destruction. As many as 311,000 civilians, 12.5 percent of the prewar inhabitants, perished through exposure, starvation, massacres, and deportation. 187 The greatest significance of atrocities in East Prussia, as in the west, may thus lie less in what they presaged than in their immediate, impressive power to mobilize. Internationally, East Prussian suffering never could compete for attention with that of the Belgians. This was partly inevitable: the plight of a region belonging to a belligerent power was always going to attract less sympathy than a neutral country invaded. It was also a consequence of the late and unimpressive 185 For Polish and Jewish victims, see Laura Engelstein, "'A Belgium of Our Own': The Sack of Russian Kalisz, August 1914," Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 10 ð2009Þ: 441-73. 186 Holquist, "Les violences de l'armée russe," 191-219. 187 
